Red rubies connection

Before the Soviet counteroffensive Uranus was launched at Stalingrad, Nikita S. Khrushchev spent much time checking on troop readiness and morale, interrogating Nazi prisoners, and recruiting some for Soviet propaganda. One of his jewels captured at Stalingrad was Field marshal Friedrich W.E. Paulus, the commander of the German VI Army who became a POW and Soviet propagandist in the newly created East German Republic. During WW II Marshall Paulus was struck by the death of one of his sons Friederich killed in the battle for Anzio. Soon after Stalingrad, Khrushchev also met with personal tragedy, as his son Leonid, a fighter pilot, was apparently shot down and killed in action on March 11, 1943. The circumstances of Leonid’s death remained obscure and controversial, as none of his fellow fliers stated that they witnessed him being shot down, nor was his plane found or body recovered. As a result, Leonid’s fate has been the subject of considerable speculation. One theory has Leonid surviving the crash and collaborating with the Germans, and when he was recaptured by the Soviets, Stalin ordering him shot despite Nikita S. Khrushchev pleading for his life. Leonid’s daughter, Yulia, was raised by Nikita S. Khrushchev and his wife. Yakov Dzhugashvili, Stalin’s son served as an artillery officer in the Red Army and was captured on July 16, 1941, in the early stages of the German invasion of USSR at the Battle of Smolensk. He was killed in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in 1943. Hitler offered a POW swap to Stalin, in exchange of Paulus for Yakov, but Stalin refused. After Uranus forced the Germans into retreat, Khrushchev served in other fronts of the war. He was attached to Soviet troops at the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943, which turned back the last major German offensive on Soviet soil. Khrushchev accompanied Soviet troops as they took Kiev in November 1943, entering the shattered city as Soviet forces drove out German troops. As Soviet forces met with greater success, driving the Nazis westwards towards Germany, Nikita S. Khrushchev became increasingly involved in reconstruction work in his native Ukraine. He was appointed Premier of the Ukrainian SSR in addition to his earlier party post, one of the rare instances in which the Ukrainian party and civil leader posts were held by one person.

Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Molotov meets Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler in Berlin in1940.

Captured German Generals at Stalingrad in February 1943:
(Left, with peaked cap and monocle, facing right) is Generalleutnant Carl Rodenburg of the 76th
Infantry Division, released from captivity on January 10, 1955; (Center left, with “crusher” hat, facing left) is Generalmajor Martin Lattmann of the 14th Panzer Division, released from captivity in 1948; (Center, in mountain cap) is Generalleutnant Werner Sanne of the 100th Jäger Division, died in captivity in 1952; (Right, with crusher hat, facing left) is Generaloberst Karl Strecker of the XI Corps, released from captivity in 1955.

The Krupp V3 – “England-Canon” in 1944

In the Pacific theatre, Lieutenant, Junior Grade, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was commanding the Patrol Torpedo Craft (PT) USS PT 109. With his crew, he participated in the early campaigns in the Allies’ long struggle to roll back the Japanese from their conquests throughout the island chains of the Pacific Ocean. On August 2, 1943, as PT 109 was running silent to avoid detection it was struck by the Japanese destroyer Amagiri. Traveling at 40 knots, the destroyer cut PT 109 in two. The entire crew was thrown into the dark waters. Kennedy towed an injured crew member 4 miles to a small island to the southeast. All eleven survivors made it to the island after having spent a total of fifteen hours in the water. After four days on the island they were finally rescued on August 8. On August 12, 1944, his sibling Joseph Patrick Kennedy, Jr. was KIA during the operation Aphrodite. The action was planned to destroy the bunkers of the Nazi V3 secret super gun, built at Mimoyecques across the English Channel to bomb London. The 130 m long gun used multiple solid-fuel rocket boosters. This layout generated the German codename Tausendfüßler (“millipede”). The smoothbore gun fired a fin-stabilized shell, dependent upon aerodynamic rather than gyroscopic forces to prevent tumbling. The destruction of the bunkers was anticipated to be carried out by explosive-laden aircraft piloted by a skeleton crew who would parachute from the aircraft before detonation. However, the explosives in the Joseph Kennedy-piloted drone detonated prematurely in flight, and the aircraft exploded, killing all aboard instantly over Blythburgh, England. After his death, J.P.Kennedy Jr. was awarded the Air Medal and Navy Cross for heroism. In December 1945, the navy commissioned a destroyer and named it the USS Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. A year later, Kennedy’s younger brother Robert briefly served aboard the ship. After serious discussions with Jack about his future, Joseph P. Kennedy Sr. convinced him to run for Congress in Massachusetts’ eleventh congressional district, where he won in 1946. This was the beginning of Jack’s political career. As the time went on, John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, served three terms (six years) in the House of Representatives, and in 1952 he was elected to the U.S. Senate.

 

John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) and brother

Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. (1915-1944)

 

The creation of the CIA in 1947, proved the determination of Congress and President Truman that Pearl Harbor should never happen again. Truman wanted the CIA to provide high-quality, objective analysis becoming the first centralized, civilian intelligence agency in American history. In 1954, the USAF General James Doolittle warned President Eisenhower, that the USA needed to be more hard-nosed and cold-blooded. “We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us.” CIA plan of action soon changed, mostly because of the growing Soviet threat, including the blockade of Berlin, Stalin’s tightening grip on Eastern Europe, and Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb. The Cold War began as a rivalry over war-ravaged Europe but spread far and wide, a contest of ideology, politics, culture, economics, geography, and military might. The battle against communism never escalated into direct combat between the superpowers but it was fought in the shadows between war and peace. It played out in what Secretary of State Dean Rusk once called the “back alleys of the world.” Stalin became convinced after the WW II victory over the Nazis, that the Soviet state is unbeatable. He deliberately expanded the brutal, closed system he had perfected in the 1930s, creating perpetual tension in society, constant struggle against majority of citizens who were deemed “enemies of the people.” The common Soviet citizen was prohibited to receive a book from abroad, or listen to a foreign radio broadcast, or travel overseas. Unauthorized contacts with foreigners were severely punished, phones were tapped, mail opened, and secret police informers encouraged and rewarded. The secret police agents were in every factory and office and it was dangerous for anyone to speak frankly, even in intimate circles. Despite that hostile environment, CIA scored two major breakthroughs in the 1950s and 1960s, when Pyotr S. Popov and Oleg V. Penkovsky, both officers of Soviet military intelligence GRU, began to spy for the USA. Surprisingly they were volunteers, not recruited, who came forward separately, spilling secrets to the CIA largely outside Moscow, each demonstrating the immense advantages of a clandestine agent. For the early Cold War period at least, “Berlin Operations Base” it is said to have been one of the most active and productive postings for CIA intelligence officers in Europe. Its first Chief of Base was Allen W. Dulles then Richard Helms succeeded Dulles in October, 1945. In the allied occupied Berlin, the Soviet intelligence services moved in their compound in the Karlshorst district, about the same time as their Western counterparts. However their mission always was dramatically different from that of the CIA and the Western intelligence services. While for the Western Allies, Berlin was an important strategic intelligence base, the city provided no equivalent advantages for the Soviet services. The main foreign intelligence target for the Soviets, was the US military presence in Western Europe, a target the Soviets shared with their East German counterpart in the Normanenstraße, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, or Stasi). Both sides used Berlin as an arena in which they could challenge the intelligence services of the opposing side. Moreover, the high level of intelligence activity in Berlin meant that counterintelligence problems always assumed a high priority, sometimes even overshadowing the more important “positive” mission of intelligence collection. It was partly because of Berlin’s value as an intelligence base for America and its allies. That is why the East German government sealed off the western half of the city in 1961 severely inhibiting Allied intelligence operations there, without incurring a similar disadvantage for the Eastern Bloc services.
The CIA intelligence unforgettable saga began on New Year’s Day 1953, in Vienna occupied by American, British, French, and Soviet troops. Then a short and stocky Russian handed over an envelope to a U.S. diplomat who was getting into his car in the international zone. The envelope carried a letter, dated December 28, 1952, written in Russian, which said, “I am a Soviet officer and I wish to meet with an American officer with the object of offering certain services.” CIA analysts evaluated the letter and decided to send an officer to the indicated meeting place at the requested time to meet their contact. On the following Saturday evening, the Soviet man was waiting where he promised to be, in a hat and bulky overcoat. That was Pyotr S. Popov, a twenty nine year old major in Soviet military intelligence, the reputed Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (GRU). That was the parallel organization to Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) or the Committee for State Security. Popov was a case officer working against Yugoslav targets based in Vienna. He became soon the CIA’s first most valuable clandestine military source on the inner workings of the Soviet army and security services. He met sixty six times with the CIA agents in Vienna between January 1953 and August 1955. His CIA case officer, was designated George Kisevalter, the son of an Imperial Russian Army munitions expert, and grandson of a Russian deputy finance minister. Kisevalter was born on April 4, 1910, in St. Petersburg, Russian Empire. In 1915, Kisevalter’s father, accompanied by his family, was sent by Imperial Government to the United States to purchase weapons for the Russian military. In 1917, during his business trip, the Bolshevik Revolution occurred in Russia. That triggered a year later the execution of the Tsar Nicholas II and his entire family, by a firing squad led by Yakov Mikhailovich Yurovsky, on orders of Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov, both Bolshevik devotees. Being close to the Imperial inner circle, Kisevalters were forced to remain in the United States, where they eventually took US citizenship, and settled in New York City. The young George attended Stuyvesant High School, and in 1926 he entered Dartmouth College to study engineering, eventually becoming classmate of Nelson Rockefeller. During his CIA collaboration, Popov revealed to Kisevalter his background as the son of peasants who grew up on the dirt floor of a hut, and had not owned a proper pair of leather shoes until he was thirteen years old. He boiled his hatred against Stalin who destroyed the Russian peasantry through forced collectivization and famine. His spying was motivated by a desire to avenge the injustice inflicted on his parents and his small village near the Volga River. In the CIA safe house in Vienna, Kisevalter kept some magazines, such as Life and Look, but Popov was mostly fascinated by American Farm Journal. The CIA helped Popov forge a key to allow him to open the classified drawers at the GRU station in Vienna. Popov identified there the Soviet intelligence officers in the area and delivered information on a broad array of Warsaw Pact units. He also handed over to Kisevalter some virtual rubies such as a 1954 Soviet military field service manual for atomic weapons usage. When Popov was reassigned to Moscow in 1955, CIA headquarters sent an undercover officer to the city to scout for dead drops or concealed locations, where Popov could leave messages. CIA man was tracked by Soviet counterintelligence, so he was snared in a KGB “honeypot” trap, ending badly the CIA’s first attempt to establish an outpost in Moscow. In April 1958, Popov told Kisevalter that a senior KGB official had boasted of having “full technical details” of the Lockheed U-2 spy plane, leading U2 project director, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., to conclude the project had a leak. Popov was dismissed from the GRU in November 1958, and placed on reserve status, under surveillance of KGB. In January 1959, after incriminating evidence was found in his apartment, he was run as a double agent for three months. Later on he was arrested in October 1959, and sentenced to death in January 1960. Today are standing several versions of the exposure scenarios of Popov. One possibility is that US surveillance in October 1957 of one of Popov’s agents led to suspicion falling on him. Reportedly, Margarita Nikolievska Tairov, an “illegal” agent trained for work in the USA, was scheduled to meet another agent (her husband, Igor), identified as Walter Anthony Sjoa. Travelling as Mary Grodnik, she noticed that she was under surveillance, allegedly all the way from Berlin Tempelhof Airport. She reported this issue, and the matter was heavily investigated by Moscow. The investigation pointed to Popov, who had been the woman’s control officer in East Berlin. He may also have been exposed by British double agent George Behar-Blake, who inadvertently learned the CIA was using a senior Soviet intelligence officer stationed in East Germany as a mole, when Popov passed a letter to British intelligence. More recent evidence suggests that Popov was already under suspicion prior to the Tairov incident, due to a leak of a private speech by Marshal Zhukov at which Popov was present. As per the KGB defector Lt. Col. Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko’s testimony, a diplomat in Moscow, mailing Popov a letter, had failed to spot a Soviet surveillant, and the letter was retrieved from the mailbox and decoded. Nonetheless, Popov was able to pass one last message to his handlers. The KGB, intending to use him as a double agent, had sent him to a meeting with CIA case officer Russell Langelle in Moscow. In full view of KGB surveillance, Popov shook Langelle’s hand and in the process furtively slipped him a note, cached in a cylinder the size of a cigarette, revealing that he had passed under hostile control. The famous cylinder message provided a detailed account of the KGB’s understanding of Popov’s cooperation with the Americans and their plans to exploit him in the future. He had painstakingly written the message while in prison, over a period of months, concealing it under a bandage he had managed to obtain by cutting his finger. Kisevalter was devastated by the note’s heartbreaking last words: “Could you not ask your kind President Eisenhower to see if he might cause restitution to be made for my family and my life?” Shortly after the meeting, Langelle was expelled from Russia and Popov sent to a Soviet firing squad in 1960.

KGB General Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny (first from left), talking to Soviet intelligence officers
Rudolf Abel (second from left) and Konon Molody (second from right) in 1964.

KGB General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov and Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the
Soviet Union, Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

KGB (ret) Lt. Gen. Nikolai S. Leonov with Fidel and Raul Castro in Cuba.

In April 1959, the CIA informed MI5 that their mole code named Sniper (a.k.a. Michael Goleniewski) a Lt. Colonel of Polish Intelligence (Słuzba Bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych) SB & MSW, had a British informant inside the Royal Navy.
The CIA also told MI5 that Goleniewski had received top secret documents originating from a Soviet mole inside MI6. The mole himself (who later turned out to be George Behar-Blake) heard the news that the CIA had a top-level informant in Poland, and sent word back to the KGB, who passed it to the Polish SB. Goleniewski heard the news from the KGB, and immediately escaped. He also provided information that led to the arrests of American diplomat Irvin C. Scarbeck, Swedish Air Force officer Stig Wennerström, and KGB agents in the West Germany Spy Agency (BND), Heinz Felfe and Hans Clemens. Goleniewski defected to the United States in January 1961, which led to the imprisonment of Soviet agents in Britain including the Portland Spy Ring and George Behar-Blake. Goleniewski went to work for the CIA, and a Polish court sentenced him to death in absentia. A private bill, H.R. 5507, was introduced in the U.S. Congress in July 1963, to make Goleniewski a US citizen. The legislation was passed by both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate. Sniper said the information was reaching the Soviets from the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment at Portland, England, where the Royal Navy tested equipment for undersea warfare. The letters were passed on to MI5, the British security service and soon suspicion fell on Harry Houghton, a former sailor who was a civil service clerk at the base. He had just bought his fourth car and a house, being also a heavy drinker with expenses far beyond his low level salary. MI5 put Houghton under surveillance also his mistress, Ethel Gee. She was a base filling clerk who handled documents that Houghton himself did not have access to. They often went to London, where they would meet a man identified as Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, a Canadian businessman. During these meetings Lonsdale and Houghton exchanged packages. Lonsdale allegedly dealt in jukeboxes and bubble gum machines, often traveled abroad and was a lady’s man. MI5 promptly put him under surveillance and it was found that Lonsdale often went to Ruislip in north-west London to visit an antiquarian bookseller, Peter Kroger and his wife Helen. The Krogers were also put under close but discreet watch.
On Saturday, January 7, 1961, Houghton, Gee and Lonsdale were meeting in London when they were arrested by Special Branch detectives jointly led by Chief Inspector Ian Harold Brown and Detective Superintendent George Gordon Smith, as MI5 officers were not authorised to make arrests. Gee’s shopping bag contained huge amounts of films and photographs of classified material, including details of HMS Dreadnought, UK first nuclear submarine, and the stalling speed specifications of the Borg Warner torque converter.
Then Smith and two colleagues went to Ruislip to see the Krogers. By claiming to be investigating some local burglaries they gained access in the house. Once inside they identified themselves as Special Branch officers and asked the Krogers to accompany them to Scotland Yard for questioning. Before leaving, Mrs Kroger asked to be allowed to stoke up the boiler. Before she could, Smith insisted on checking her handbag first. It was found to contain microdots, the photographic reduction of documents in order to make them small enough to be smuggled more easily. Smith, a veteran spy catcher, had guessed her intention to destroy these microdots. The microdots found at the Krogers’ home were letters sent between Lonsdale and his wife, who lived in the USSR with their children. These included things like money matters and how the children were doing at school. Kroger had used the print in his antique books to hold the microdots and smuggle them between Britain and USSR. These would have included the secrets passed on by Houghton and Gee.
The Krogers’ house was full of spying equipment, including large sums of money, photographic material, code pads for coding messages and a long-range radio transmitter-receiver for communicating with Moscow. It took several days to unearth all the equipment, and other items including fake passports were not found until after the police had left. The MI5 intelligence officer Peter Wright has stated that the Krogers’ radio transmitter was only located after nine days of searching. Large amounts of money were also found in the homes of Houghton, Gee and Lonsdale. Two days after their arrest, all five were charged with espionage at Bow Street Magistrates Court. Gee and the Krogers protested their innocence; Houghton tried to turn Queen’s Evidence but was refused, and Lonsdale maintained complete silence. By the time the trial began on March 13, 1961, no-one knew for sure who he was or where he came from. In giving evidence, Gee claimed that as far as she knew, Lonsdale was Alex Johnson, an American naval Commander who wanted to know how the British were handling information passed on by the United States. She had had no idea that the information was actually going to the Russians. She had gone along out of love for Houghton, her first lover after a lifetime of spinsterhood. Houghton claimed that he had been the subject of threats by mystery men and beatings by thugs if he failed to pass on information. These men had also made threats concerning Gee and Houghton’s ex-wife. He too, claimed, he had only known Lonsdale as Alex Johnson and he tried desperately to minimize Gee’s involvement. Neither Lonsdale nor the Krogers took the stand, but in statements read out in court, Lonsdale took responsibility. He claimed that the Krogers were innocent: he had often looked after their house while they were away and had used it to hide his spying equipment without their knowledge. Peter and Helen Kroger backed up this claim, saying that Peter was simply an antiquarian bookseller and Helen a housewife. But they could not explain why fake Canadian passports with their photos were found in the house, intended for a possible get-away. The jury returned verdicts of guilty for all of the accused. Superintendent Smith then took the stand stating that through their fingerprints, the Krogers had been identified as Morris and Lona Cohen, renowned atomic spies who had worked with Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, Rudolf Abel and David Greenglass (Ethel’s brother) in the USA for Soviet Union. Smith also revealed Cohen’s past life in the military and scholastic service. Lonsdale remained a man of mystery in spite of extensive inquiries by MI5, the FBI, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other Western intelligence services. They were convinced that he was an actual Russian and a member of the KGB, but his past could only be traced back as far as 1954 when he had first appeared in Canada. Houghton and Gee were sentenced to 15 years in prison. They were released in 1970 and married.
The Krogers (a.k.a the Cohens) were sentenced to 20 years jail. In 1969, they were exchanged for the British citizen Gerald Brooke who had been arrested by the Soviets. As part of the process the Soviets confirmed that they were spies. Lonsdale, the mastermind, was sentenced to 25 years. It is believed that the ring numbered more than the five who were arrested, but these would have included staff at the USSR and Polish embassies immune to prosecution anyway.

Julius Rosenberg, right, 34-year-old electrical engineer, and his wife, Ethel, left, 35, arrive at Federal
Courthouse in New York City in 1951.

The chief prosecutor, Irving Saypol, stated that on countless occasions, Ethel Rosenberg sat at her typewriter
and struck the keys, blow by blow, against her own country in the interests of the Soviets.” Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were found guilty and sentenced to death. They were executed by electric chair at Sing Sing prison in 1953. The Rosenberg’s saga simmered for decades following their deaths but resurfaced when subsequent reporting by Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton for a 1983 book, “The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth,” led to the conclusion that Ethel Rosenberg had not played as prominent a role in the spying as originally believed.

Michael Rosenberg, right, and his brother, Robert, left, on June 19, 1953, the day their parents were executed

In 1961, a GRU colonel named Oleg Penkovsky, an even more senior military intelligence officer, approached a group of visiting American students in Moscow and urged them to deliver a letter to the American embassy. “I offer my services to you,” Penkovsky wrote, “and I have some most significant facts to share.” Again, Kisevalter was dispatched to handle the case. The information Penkovsky provided over the next year included the manuals on the SS-4, the missiles deployed by the Soviet Union in Cuba in 1962, and the revelation that the Soviet Union did not yet possess operational ICBMs. By opening a window into the Kremlin’s internal politics, Penkovsky drew the United States back from the brink of nuclear war during the Berlin and Cuban crises. For this, Kisevalter was crowned as CIA legend and Penkovsky became a jewel of his crown, code named HERO.
Another jewel was recovered in 1962, when Yuri I. Nosenko a Soviet counterintelligence officer who had squandered KGB funds on a drinking spree with well minded hookers, volunteered his services to the CIA in Geneva. He defected to the USA in 1964 when the CIA was not so sure that was a miracle. Nosenko had participated in the KGB’s internal investigation of the J.F.Kennedy assassination, which proclaimed the KGB innocent of any involvement. Fearing the defector to be a provocation, senior officials, under the direction of the obsessed James Jesus Angleton, incarcerated him for over four years under conditions so cruel that his security guard, describing the situation to George Kisevalter, spited disgusted. CIA Spy Master venerates Kisevalter for his character and his heroism, but this painful episode is hardly evidence for either. Nosenko was ultimately released, though never exonerated, and confusion about his case remains.

In the Soviet Union, N.S.Khrushchev came to power following the death of long-time dictator Joseph Stalin in March, 1953. Soon after he surprised the world by announcing that he sought “peaceful coexistence” with the USA denouncing the “excesses” of Stalinism. On February 25, 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, he delivered the “Secret Speech”, which denounced Stalin’s purges and ushered in a less repressive era in the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s, Khrushchev continued to court a closer relationship with the USA and often praised President Dwight D. Eisenhower as a man who also sought peace. In July, 1959, U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon traveled to the Trade and Cultural Fair in Moscow, where he publicly argued with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev over the merits of capitalism versus communism. Since the conversation occurred in the middle of a display of modern American kitchen conveniences, it became known as the “kitchen debate.” In 1959, the U.S. and Soviet governments shocked the world by announcing that Khrushchev would visit America in September and meet with Eisenhower face to face. Nikita S. Khrushchev becomes the first Soviet head of state to visit the USA. N.S.Khrushchev arrived in the USA on September 15, with a plan to tour America and conclude his trip nearly two weeks later with a summit meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Hopes were high that the visit would mark a turning point in the Cold War and that perhaps the Soviet leader’s soft-proclaimed desire for “peaceful coexistence” with the United States would become a reality. N.S.Khrushchev’s first day in America was mostly taken up with formal receptions and a motorcade from the airport to downtown Washington. At the airport, N.S.Khrushchev announced that he had arrived in America “with open heart and good intentions because the Soviet people want to live in friendship with the American people.” Groups of spectators and several military bands lined the way of the motorcade procession from the airport. Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Mme. Khrushchev sat together in the back of a convertible to wave at the crowds. Once in town, Khrushchev almost immediately sat for a nearly two-hour talk with Eisenhower and his advisers. Longer and more involved talks were scheduled for later in the Soviet leader’s visit. “Because of our importance in the world, it is vital that we understand each other better,” Eisenhower declared at a state dinner that night. Khrushchev agreed, adding that friendship was necessary “because our two countries are much too strong and we cannot quarrel with each other.” During the next few days, Khrushchev took the opportunity to tour the United States before his summit meeting with Eisenhower. Although Khrushchev’s trip was more of a goodwill visit than an opportunity for significant negotiations, the tour provided some moments of high drama and low comedy, particularly during the Soviet leader’s trip through California. The Soviet leader made his entrance at 20th Century Fox on September 19, 1959 where he would call Can-Can, exploitive and pornographic.
Khrushchev made his second and final visit to the United States in September 1960. He had no invitation, but he had appointed himself as head of the USSR’s UN delegation and he spent much of his time courting the new Third World states which had recently become independent. The U.S. restricted him to the island of Manhattan, with visits to an estate owned by the USSR on Long Island. The notorious shoe-banging incident occurred during a debate on October 12, over a Soviet resolution decrying colonialism. Infuriated by a statement of the Filipino delegate Lorenzo Sumulong which charged the Soviets with employing a double standard by decrying colonialism while dominating Eastern Europe, Khrushchev demanded the right to reply immediately, and accused Sumulong of being “a fawning lackey of the American imperialists”. Sumulong resumed his speech, and accused the Soviets of hypocrisy. Khrushchev yanked off his shoe and began banging it on his desk. Khrushchev always considered U.S. Vice President R. Nixon a hardliner, and was delighted by his defeat in the 1960 presidential election. He considered the victor, Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy, as a far more likely partner for détente, but was disconcerted by the newly inaugurated U.S. President’s tough talk and actions in the early days of his administration. But the new president wanted to befriend with the Soviet premier, so that in a letter delivered to Khrushchev in March, J.F.Kennedy proposed the two leaders meet for an informal exchange of views. Accordingly, they conferred without a set agenda in Vienna for a two-day summit on June 3, 1961, Khrushchev took a harsh stance over Berlin, a Western enclave within communist-controlled East Germany, where the United States, Britain and France had maintained a symbolic military presence since the German defeat in World War II. In addition to Berlin, J.F.Kennedy later told reporters, Khrushchev had berated him on a wide range of Cold War issues, including “wars of national liberation” and nuclear weapons. At their final meeting, Kennedy tried heat up the cold atmosphere over Berlin. “It is up to the U.S. to decide whether there will be war or peace,” Khrushchev said. “Then, Mr. Chairman,” J.F.Kennedy responded, “there will be war. It will be a cold winter.”
Khrushchev achieved a propaganda victory in April 1961 with the first manned spaceflight and Kennedy a defeat with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. While Khrushchev had threatened to defend Cuba with Soviet missiles, the premier contented himself with after-the-fact aggressive remarks. The failure in Cuba led to Kennedy’s determination to make no concessions at the Vienna summit scheduled for June 3, 1961. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took a hard line, with Khrushchev demanding a treaty that would recognize the two German states and refusing to yield on the remaining issues obstructing a test-ban treaty. Kennedy on the other hand had been led to believe that the test-ban treaty could be concluded at the summit, and felt that a deal on Berlin had to await easing of East–West tensions. J.F.Kennedy described negotiating with Khrushchev to his brother Robert as “like dealing with Dad. All give and no take.”The maximum territorial extent of countries in the world under Soviet influence, after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and before the official Sino-Soviet split of 1961. An indefinite postponement of action over Berlin was unacceptable to Khrushchev, if for no other reason than that East Germany was suffering a continuous “brain drain” as highly educated East Germans fled west through Berlin. While the boundary between the two German states had elsewhere been fortified, Berlin, administered by the four Allied powers, remained open. Emboldened by statements from former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen and United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Chairman J. William Fulbright that East Germany had every right to close its borders, which were not disavowed by the Kennedy Administration, Khrushchev authorized East German leader Walter Ulbricht to begin construction of what became known as the Berlin Wall, which would surround West Berlin. Construction preparations were made in great secrecy, and the border was sealed off in the early hours of Sunday, August 13, 1961, when most East German workers who earned hard currency by working in West Berlin would be at their homes. The wall was a propaganda disaster, and marked the end of Khrushchev’s attempts to conclude a peace treaty among the Four Powers and the two German states. In May 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was persuaded by the idea of countering the US’s growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite the misgivings of the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, Alexandr Ivanovich Alexeyev, who argued that Castro would not accept the deployment of the missiles. Khrushchev faced a strategic situation in which the USA was perceived to have a “splendid first strike” capability that put the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage. In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the Soviet Union. The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raised serious doubts about their effectiveness. A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1965.Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). The missiles could hit American allies and most of Alaska from Soviet territory but not the Contiguous USA. Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, pointed out, “The Soviet Union could not correct the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one.” A second reason that Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin, controlled by the American, British and French within Communist East Germany, into the Soviet orbit. The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion of Berlin a grave threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War. He believed that if the US did nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba, he could muscle the West out of Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western countermeasures in Berlin. If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets after it became aware of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand trading the missiles for West Berlin. Since Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba, the trade would be a win for Khrushchev, as Kennedy recognized: “The advantage is, from Khrushchev’s point of view, he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it.”
More than 100 US-built missiles having the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads were deployed in Italy and Turkey in 1961.That was beside the PGM-17 Thor missiles deployed to the UK starting in August 1958, operated by 20 squadrons of RAF Bomber Command under US-UK dual key control.
Khrushchev was also reacting in part to the nuclear threat of obsolescent Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles that had been installed by the US in Turkey in April 1962. The PGM-19 Jupiter was the first nuclear tipped, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) of the United States Air Force (USAF). It was a liquid-propellant rocket using RP-1 fuel and LOX oxidizer, with a single Rocketdyne LR70-NA (model S-3D) rocket engine producing 667 kN of thrust. It was armed with the 1.1 megaton W49 nuclear warhead. The prime contractor was the Chrysler Corporation. The Jupiter was originally designed by the US Army, which was looking for a highly accurate missile designed to strike high-value targets like bridges, railway yards, troop concentrations and the like. The Navy also expressed an interest in the design as an SLBM, but left the collaboration to work on their Polaris. Jupiter retained the short, squat shape intended to fit in naval submarines. The U.S. Army set accuracy goals so high that some expressed skepticism they could be met, but the Redstone team successfully designed a system with a circular error probable (CEP) of 0.5 miles (0.80 km), substantially more accurate than similar designs like the US Air Force’s Thor. A presidential report suggested this made it the most valuable missile then being developed. This led to continual inter-service fighting between the Army and Air Force, and ultimately to Charles Erwin Wilson’s decision to give the Jupiter missiles to the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force was never greatly interested in supporting Jupiter; they saw no need for its accuracy in their battle plans and had their own Thor with longer range. Production went ahead and the nuclear tipped missiles were deployed in both Italy and Turkey in 1961 due to NATO’s Cold War deterrence against the Soviet Union. All were then later removed by the United States as part of a secret agreement (The Secret Deal) with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as they were considered outdated. Jupiter was also used as the basis for a satellite launcher known as Juno II, but had a short and unsuccessful career in this role. It is unclear as to what happened to the missiles in Italy, but they too were removed at some point.

In due course the GRU colonel Oleg Penkovsky, provided information that convinced the Americans that Khrushchev had greatly exaggerated Soviet missile capability. Penkovsky was known to SIS and CIA from 1955, when stationed in Ankara as assistant military attaché, he had approached various intelligence officers and military attaches to offer them his knowledge of Soviet plans for the Middle East. Per the request of CIA, British SIS was able to recruit Penkovsky with the help of a British businessman, Greville Wynne. He had been recruited as an agent to try to penetrate the State Committee for Science and Technology, which functioned as a cover organisation for KGB and GRU agents spying on Western technology. Luckily, Penkovsky was a member of that committee, and in April 1961 he handed a bulky package of documents and film to Wynne. SIS arranged another contact for Penkovsky, from who he could receive messages, as Janet Chisholm, wife of Rauri Chisholm, a British SIS officer in the Moscow embassy under diplomatic cover. Unfortunately Rauri Chisholm had previously served at the SIS station in Berlin, where one of his SIS colleagues was none other than SIS officer George Blake. That George Blake born George Behar per his Jewish father name in November 1922, worked as a double agent for the Soviet Union. He became a Communist and decided to work for the KGB while a prisoner during the Korean War. His lifetime achievement was the betrayal of the Berlin Tunnel in “Operation Gold”. The operation was designed to be the CIA’s biggest coup in the spy war. The plan was to tap into the landlines linking East Berlin with Moscow at a point where they ran close to the Western sector. The large scale operation involved tunneling experts, telephone engineers, recording experts and teams of transcribers and translators. Because initially the operation was considered a major success the CIA handed out gold medals to its officers who had been involved. The real output was in fact a bitter failure due to the devastating contribution of SIS officer George Behar-Blake. As the planning secretary of the joint Anglo-American intelligence committee responsible for running the operation, he passed on to KGB the minutes of the meetings and copies of the committee records. Instead of “discovering” the tunnel before it became operational and displaying outrage at Western perfidy, the KGB allowed it to go ahead and then deliberately planted deception material on the unsuspecting CIA-SIS team. Then later on the Soviets moved into the eastern end of the tunnel and turned the operation into a propaganda victory. Until Behar-Blake’s treachery was discovered, this operation had been hailed as a resounding success. It is claimed that in the course of nine years, Blake betrayed details of some forty MI6 agents to the KGB. Blake later said of this, “I don’t know what I handed over because it was so much”. In 1959 Blake became aware of a Central Intelligence Agency mole inside GRU, becoming instrumental in exposing Pyotr S. Popov, the GRU major stationed in East Germany. In 1961, Blake fell under suspicion after revelations by Polish defector Michael Goleniewski and others. He was arrested when he arrived in London after being summoned from Lebanon. On April 9, 1961, during his interrogation, Blake strongly denied that he was tortured or blackmailed by the North Koreans, but finally admitted that he had switched sides voluntarily. He then gave Harold Shergol, his MI6 interrogator, a full confession, therefore he ended up being sentenced to 14 years for each count of treason, totalling 42 years imprisonment. Five years later, on October 22, 1966, Behar-Blake escaped from Wormwood Scrubs prison, London, aided by two senior members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Michael Randle and Pat Pottle and Sean Bourke a petty criminal from Limerick, Ireland. Bourke and the two others got Blake out of the country hidden in a van to East Germany. Shortly afterwards, with KGB help, Bourke joined Blake in Moscow, where he lived for a year on KGB funding. However, he disliked Russia and returned to Ireland, where he mysteriously died later on of intoxication. Blake was divorced of his wife, a former MI6 secretary Gillian Allan with whom he had three children. While in Russia, he started a new life upon the KGB supervision. SIS knew that Blake had exposed also the Chisholms as British spies, but SIS still continued to use Janet Chisholm to make contact with Penkovsky in Moscow until January 1962. SIS did not, of course, tell Penkovsky that Janet Chisholm had been compromised, yet it must have known that it was only a matter of time before he would be exposed. Once KGB counter-intelligence had conclusive evidence of Penkovsky’s treachery, it arrested him and then his buddy Greville Wynne. They went on trial in May 1963. Wynne got eight years but in April 1964 he was exchanged for a Soviet illegal, Gordon Arnold Lonsdale (a.k.a. Konon Trofimovich Molody), in fact a KGB officer imprisoned in Britain since 1961 in the PERCY case. Wynne went to live in Majorca, Spain were he died in 1990 after a long battle with alcoholism. KGB defector Vladimir Sakharov, who had a diplomatic status based in the Middle East before he defected in 1971, claimed that Penkovsky was a sincere man believing in his mission to stop WW III, and what he said has been proved almost entirely true. If J.F.Kennedy had invaded Cuba, the Soviet commander there, general Issa A Pliyev, had full permission to launch tactical nuclear weapons against US troops deployed in the area, but to bomb America would had needed Politburo permission. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union stopped the USA when it was about to invade and destroy Cuba. It was Operation Anadyr and Soviet missiles that averted the disaster, so the communist Cuba was left intact and free of ballistic umbrella over its head. On the other hand, US missiles were taken out of Turkey under the Soviet threat, that was eventually recognized as coming from a nuclear power, the best selling Penkovsky’s idea. The KGB chief General Vladimir Y. Semichastny claimed that he had been ordered to ignore Penkovsky for six months, because he was the concern of military intelligence. He was seen meeting various people in hotel suites and at dinners. They would go to a bathroom and turn the water on. Once this behavior became known, the surveillance was increased to day and night frequency. However, Penkovsky was still a difficult pray due to his high ranks patrons. His uncle, Valentin Penkovsky, was a lieutenant general and one of the Defense Ministry’s top brass, while his father-in-law was General Gaponovich, head of the Moscow region’s political administration. But there was another spy in service of US NSA since 1958, named Jack Dunlap, who also exposed Penkovsky for money to KGB. His luck did not last for long and on July 22, 1963, Victor Norris Hamilton, a Syrian-born research analyst at US NSA headquarters, turned up in Moscow and announced that he was defecting. As an agent of the KGB in Moscow, he joined two other former NSA employees such as Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, who had defected to the Soviet Union three years earlier. While working as KGB moles at US NSA HQ, they had provided the Soviets with information about the technical capabilities and locations of the very secret sensors that the NSA had employed against them, and also with data about the NSA’s codes and breaking techniques. For Dunlap, this was a terrifying time. His mental state began to unravel due to paranoid fears of shadowy men in dark corridors asking him to ‘just come this way’, or a platoon of soldiers kicking down the door. Finally, it all got too much for him, and on July 22nd, 1964, he drove to an abandoned creek and suffocated himself with his car’s exhaust fumes. One month later, when Dunlap s wife found sealed packets of Government documents in the attic of their house, it was reported that he was indeed a Soviet agent. All this time, the soviet intelligence officers were stationed in apartments above and across the river from Penkovksy’s home. After an extended period of surveillance, the KGB arrested Penkovsky, on October 22, 1962, and put him on trial for treason and espionage. After a public trial in May 1963, Penkovsky was sentenced to death. He was executed in Lubyanka prison in Moscow, on May 16, 1963. Penkovsky’s ashes allegedly were dumped into a mass grave at Donskoi Monastery cemetery in Moscow. The Chisholms, who had diplomatic immunity, went off to other postings. Rauri Chisholm died in 1979, but Mrs. Chisholm lives in quiet retirement in Britain. Only the former GRU intelligence colonel Penkovsky died a lot younger and in a rush, 6 month only before the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy.

KGB design spy camera – KMZ

CIA top spy camera – MINOX

 

Penkovsky trial documents

Amid the descent of the Iron Curtain, the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and the conflict in Vietnam, lies one of the more bizarre moments of the Cold War – Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s goodwill tour of the United States that began on September 15, 1959. On June 3rd, 1961, President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev met in Vienna for a two-day summit. In a letter delivered to Khrushchev in March, J.F.Kennedy proposed the two leaders meet for an informal exchange of views. Accordingly, they conferred without a set agenda.
For the first time, deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles and troops to Cuba, was proposed by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev on May 20, 1962 during his meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan. The operation was planned by Marshal Ivan Bagramyan, Col. Gen. Semyon Ivanov and Lt. Gen. Anatoly Gribkov. In May 1962, a soviet delegation arrived in Havana comprising of “irrigators and ameliorators,” led by the head of an agricultural, cotton-producing republic Sharof Rashidov, the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. The group included Col. Gen. Semyon P.Ivanov and several missile construction specialists and other military experts, whose job it was to determine whether the missiles could be deployed in secrecy. Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev took Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro aside to explain that “Engineer Petrov” in the group actually was Marshal Sergey Semyonovich Biryuzov, and that he needed to meet with “el lider maximo” Fidel, without delay. Only three hours later “Engineer Petrov” was shown into Fidel Castro’s office. The Cuban leadership unanimously and enthusiastically gave its approval in principle. In Moscow, Ambassador Foy D. Kohler briefed Khrushchev on the pending blockade and J.F.Kennedy’s speech to the nation. Ambassadors around the world gave notice to non-Eastern Bloc leaders. Before the speech, US delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and French President Charles de Gaulle to brief them on the US intelligence and their proposed response. All were supportive of the US position. Later on a total of 85 Soviet cargo ships which conducted 180 voyages from Soviet ports in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Barents Sea, carried out the Operation Anadyr, the Soviet missile and troop deployment covered up by a complex denial and deception campaign.
On October 1, 1962, the Project 641 [Foxtrot] diesel-electric submarine B-59, as the flagship of a detachment with its sister ships B-36(Captain Second rank Dubivko A. F.), B-4 (Captain Second Rank Ketov R. A) and B-130 (Captain Second Rank Shumkov N. A.), grouped as the 69th brigade of diesel torpedo submarines (Captain First Rank Agafonov Vasili Naumovich), sailed from its base on the Kola Peninsula to the Caribbean Sea, as operation “Kama” in support of Soviet missiles deliveries to Cuba (operation Anadyr). The top commander was the Soviet Army Corps General, Issa Pliyev, from July 1962 to May 1963 ).” Each submarine deployed to Cuba, was carrying one nuclear torpedo. On October 14, 1962, a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser, took 928 pictures on a path selected by DIA analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at San Cristobal, Pinar del Rio Province (now in Artemisa Province), in western Cuba. In the evening of October 14, 1962, the CIA notified the Department of State, but McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor to US President, chose to wait until the next morning to tell the news to J.F.Kennedy. Meanwhile Robert McNamara the Secretary of Defense was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with J.F.Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA’s analysis of the images. At 6:30 pm EDT, J.F.Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisors, in a group formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) after the facts on October 22 by the National Security Action Memorandum# 196. President J.F. Kennedy met with Congressional leaders who contentiously opposed a blockade and demanded a stronger response. On October 27, Major Rudolf Anderson took off in a U-2F (AF-SN 56-6676, former CIA Article 343) from a forward operating location at McCoy AFB in Orlando, Florida. A few hours into his mission, he was shot down and killed by a S-75 Dvina surface-to-air missile near Banes, Cuba, fired by a SAM battery commanded by Major Ivan Gerchenov. Since 1960 American U-2s penetrated Soviet airspace twenty-four times. One aircraft was lost but the pilot survived (Gary Powers). During 15-years of reconnaissance operations code-named Project Razor, ROC pilots flew 102 missions that penetrated the bamboo curtain, including overflights over North Korea and Northern Indochina. Surface-to-air missiles shot down five U-2s over Mainland China when three ROC pilots were killed and two taken prisoner.

http://area51specialprojects.com/u2_blackcat_taiwan.html

On October 15, the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. It was the Soviet missile manuals provided before the Cuban missile crisis by GRU Colonel Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky that enabled the Americans to interpret their photographs taken from the air over Cuba and to realise that the Soviets were installing missile launchers there.

Beginning from October 22, a US naval blockade of Cuba went into effect. To carry it out and to search for Soviet submarines, the US Navy deployed over 130 combat surface ships, over 100 planes of the base patrol aviation, four aircraft carrier search and assault groups with 50-60 planes on board. There were also used destroyers charged with discovering and destroying the submarines at the very start of the military action. Almost on every bandwidth, interference transmitters were turned on at the start of transmission of information from Moscow, which resulted in delays of reception of orders from the Headquarters of the Navy from several hours to a full day. On October 27, units of the US Navy, the aircraft carrier USS Randolph and 11 destroyers detected the B-59 sub near Cuba. US warships began dropping depth charges of the type used for naval training and containing very little charge. The purpose was to attempt to force the submarine to the surface for positive identification. Messages from the US Navy, to communicate that practice depth charges were being used, never reached B-59 or, it seems, Soviet naval HQ. B-59 had not been in contact with Moscow for a number of days and, although the submarine’s crew had earlier been picking up US civilian radio broadcasts, once they began attempting to hide from its pursuers, it was too deep to monitor any radio traffic, so those on board did not know whether or not war had broken out. The captain of the submarine, Valentin Grigorievitch Savitsky, believing that war had already started, wanted to launch the nuclear torpedo. Captain Valentin Savitsky, the political officer Ivan S. Maslennikov, and commander of the deployed submarine detachment Vasili Arkhipov, equal in rank to Savitsky but the senior officer aboard B-59, were only authorized to launch the nuclear torpedo if attacked, and if all three agreed to do so. B-59 was the only sub in the flotilla that required three officers’ authorization in order to fire the “Special Weapon”. The other three subs only required the captain and the political officer to approve the launch, but, due to Arkhipov’s position as detachment commander, B-59’s captain and political officer were required to gain his approval as well. Arkhipov alone opposed the launch, and eventually he persuaded Savitsky to surface the submarine and await orders from Moscow. As the submarine’s batteries had run very low and its air-conditioning had failed, B-59 had to surface in order to use its diesel engine, and it surfaced amid the US warships pursuing it. B-59 then set course for the USSR. When submarine “B-59” came up to the surface, airplanes and helicopters from the aircraft carrier “Randolph” flew over the submarine 12 times at the altitude of 20-100 meters. With every overflight they fired their cannons in the course of the overflight above the boat. With such concentration of anti-submarine forces in a small area of the ocean, discovering the diesel submarines that had to surface to recharge their batteries was just a question of time. The Foxtrot could stay submerged for only maximum 5 days. The submarine “B-130,” which came to the surface for repairs of all three of its failed diesel engines (factory defects), was discovered by the anti-submarine aviation, and then also by the surface ships. When the presence of the Soviet submarines in the Sargasso Sea became obvious, the activity of anti-submarine warfare was stepped up even more. As a result, the following submarines were discovered, chased for several days, and then came to the surface because of fully discharged batteries:
-submarine “B-36” surfaced by the anti-submarine aviation and destroyer of the radiolocation patrol unit “Charles P. Cecil,” ship No. 545.
-submarine “B-59” surfaced by carrier aviation and destroyers “Berry,” “Lowry,” “Beale,” “Beich,” “Bill,” “Eaton,” “Cony,” “Conway,” “Murray,” and the anti-submarine aircraft carrier “Randolph.”
-submarine “B-4” was discovered by anti-submarine aviation, but having fully charged batteries, was able to evade the pursuit and did not come to the surface.
In the course of the search and pursuit of the submarines by ASW forces, they actively used explosive charges and the acoustic location systems “Julie-Jezebel.”
In the 1950s, many Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft were being fitted with the AN/AQA-3 “Jezebel” acoustic search (passive sonar) and “Julie” echo-ranging (active sonar) gear.
When submarine “B-36” came up to the surface, the gun muzzles and the torpedo tube launchers of the destroyer were wide open and aimed at the submarine. Helicopters lowered floating hydro-acoustic buoys along the route of the submarine and dropped explosive devices, hovered over the conning tower of the submarine and conducted filming. Similar actions were carried out against submarine “B-130.”
The fact that the submarines of the 69th brigade were not designed to be used in tropical conditions, also contributed to their discovery: the absence of air conditioning systems when the outside temperature was above 90 degree F when charging batteries; high humidity in the submarine sections and the salinity of the sea water; temperature at some of the combat posts like engine operators reached over 120 degree F. All the adverse conditions, led to the failure of the equipment /decrease in resistance of the insulation of the antennas, salinization of water refrigerators, unsealing of hermetic hull openings and cable openings. Limited reserves of fresh water allowed the distribution of only ½ liter of water per person per day, in the conditions of the strongest sweat production and dehydration of organism. To dramatically improve these living conditions, the captains were forced to partially surface to ventilate the submarine sections and their batteries.

Khrushcheva, Mamie Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and
Dwight D. Eisenhower at a state dinner in 1959

Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier
Nikita S. Khrushchev at the American National Exhibition
Opened at Sokolniki Park in Moscow on July 24th, 1959

President John F. Kennedy, Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev and wives, meeting in Vienna, Austria, June 3rd, 1961

Cpt. Vasili Arkhipov and wife Olga Arkhipova

Arkhipov’s B-59 submarine surfaced by USN

Soviet FKR cruise missile in Cuba

Czech made AA gun during Bay of Pigs invasion

Foxtrot B-413 submarine Museum, Kaliningrad, Russia

Foxtrot sub in Cuban waters

Foxtrot sub torpedo room

T-5 nuclear torpedo

The Foxtrot had 10 torpedo tubes, six at the bow and four at the stern. She could carry 22 twenty-one inch torpedoes or up to 44 AMD-1000 ground mines. The sub was also capable of carrying a T-5 standard 21 inch nuclear anti-shipping torpedo with a 15-kiloton yield. This latter weapon would make her effective against hostile carrier battle groups. The US did not find out about the submarines until late in the game, but based on accurate intelligence, they realized what catastrophic damage those submarines could have inflicted. U.S. Navy had been tracking the subs since September 27, 1962, using listening posts that detected electronically-compressed “burst radio transmissions” between Soviet Navy command posts and the submarines themselves. The messages could not be deciphered but the location from where they were transmitted could be identified. While US Navy analysts had assumed that the subs were on their way to the Barents Sea for exercises, they discovered that they were in the North Atlantic on their way to Cuba. That time the US Navy was using the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) that detected the noise made by submarine engines, also “mad contacts”, referring to magnetic anomaly detection (MAD).

NSA Headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland

CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia

Martin P5M-1 Marlin USN Flying Boat Patrol

Lockheed P2V/P-2 Neptune USN ASW Patrol

Lockheed Martin U-2 Dragon Lady

Soviet S-75 Dvina (V750) SAM

KGB Headquarters from Lubyanka Square in downtown Moscow

 

U.S. Air Force Hero, Major Rudolf Anderson

On the 12th day of the Cuban Missile Crisis, afraid that Anderson had discovered the nuclear missile  positions in detail, Lieutenant General Stepan Grechko gave the order to his deputy, “Destroy Target Number 33.” Rudolf Anderson became soon the only combat death of the Cuban Crisis. However, three reconnaissance-variant Boeing RB-47 Stratojets of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing crashed between September 27 and November 11, 1962, killing a total of 11 crewmembers. Seven more airmen died when a Boeing C-135B Stratolifter delivering ammunition to Naval Base Guantanamo Bay crashed on approach on October 23.

While the four Soviet Foxtrot submarines did not have combat orders, the Soviet Navy sent two submarines, B-75 and B-88, to the Caribbean and the Pacific respectively, with specific combat orders. B-75, a “Zulu” class diesel submarine, commanded by Captain Nikolai Natnenkov, carried two nuclear torpedoes. It left Russian waters at the end of September with instructions to defend Soviet transport ships en route to Cuba with any weapons if the ships came under attack. Once President Kennedy announced the quarantine, the Soviet navy recalled B-75 and it returned to the Soviet Union by 10 November. Another submarine, B-88, left a base at Kamchatka peninsula, on 28 October, with orders to sail to Pearl Harbor and attack the base if the crisis over Cuba escalated into U.S.-Soviet war. Commanded by Captain Konstatine Kireev, B-88 arrived near Pearl Harbor on 10 November and patrolled the area until 14 November when it received orders to return to base, orders that were cancelled that same day, a sign that Moscow believed that the crisis was not over. B-88 returned to Kamchatka by the end of December remaining undetected during its patrol. The Soviet MRBMs had arrived in Cuba with a massive support structure consisting of about 20,000 troops, multiple SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) units, various combat aircraft including IL-28N nuclear capable bombers, approximately one hundred tactical cruise missiles along with six unguided Frog rockets. By mid-November the Soviet missiles destined for Cuba were being returned to USSR and the three Foxtrots still on patrol were ordered home. The USSR found little support for its actions while an intensive U.S. diplomatic campaign brought our European allies and the Organization of American States solidly behind the Kennedy administration’s position. Then, at a meeting of the UN Security Council on October 25, Ambassador Stevenson publicly confronted doubters around the world and, in particular, the Soviet delegation with photographic evidence of the offensive missiles in Cuba, a presence they had emphatically denied. Hopes that a satisfactory resolution to the crisis could be reached between Washington and Moscow had dimmed, moreover, when a letter from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived demanding that the United States agree to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for a Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba. The letter struck U.S. officials as an ominous hardening of the Soviet position from the previous day’s letter from Khrushchev, which had omitted any mention of American missiles in Turkey but had instead implied that Washington’s pledge not to invade Cuba would be sufficient to obviate the need for Soviet nuclear protection of Castro’s revolution.
Khrushchev’s three priorities in regards to Cuba at that moment were: to negotiate a smooth withdrawal of the missiles without provoking the Americans; to get Castro to accept inspections because those were the condition for the American non-invasion pledge; and to keep Cuba as a close ally and thus preserve the Soviet Union’s legitimacy in the global communist movement. By backing Khrushchev and his de-Stalinization policy, Anastas I. Mikoyan became First Deputy Premier under Khrushchev. Mikoyan’s position under Khrushchev made him the second most powerful figure in the Soviet Union at the time. Although Mikoyan failed to alter the US’s Berlin policy, he was hailed in the US for easing international tensions with an innovative emphasis on soft diplomacy that largely went over well with the American public. He disapproved of Khrushchev’s walkout from the 1960 Paris Summit over the U-2 Crisis of 1960, which he believed kept tension in the Cold War high for another fifteen years. However, throughout this time, he remained Khrushchev’s closest ally in the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership. As Mikoyan later noted, Khrushchev “engaged [in] inexcusable hysterics.” In November 1963, Mikoyan was asked by Khrushchev to represent the USSR at President John F. Kennedy’s funeral. At the funeral ceremony, Mikoyan appeared visibly shaken by the president’s death and was approached by Jacqueline Kennedy, who took his hand and conveyed to him the following message: “Please tell Mr. Chairman [Khrushchev] that I know he and my husband worked together for a peaceful world, and now he and you must carry on my husband’s work.”

Following the Cuban crisis, Soviet intelligence filtered signals that Kennedy was not committed to the non-invasion guarantee. Khrushchev, disregarded this information aware that the crisis had placed him in a position in Moscow where he had to rely on Kennedy to keep his word. If Kennedy’s pledge were insincere, then Khrushchev’s critics in Havana and Moscow were right to describe the entire affair as a Soviet defeat. For Khrushchev’s purposes the most useful intelligence came through the KGB’s liaison with the Cuban government, which allowed the Kremlin to follow the course of Fidel Castro’s slow acceptance of the October 1962 settlement, to not open fire against US planes.

Yuri I. Nosenko, was a former lieutenant colonel in the KGB intelligence agency, who had handled the J.F.Kennedy presumptive assassin Lee Harvey Oswald’s KGB surveillance file during his time in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s. After his defection to USA, he stated that Oswald was not working for the Soviets when he got involved in Kennedy’s assassination. By all means an Oswald met with Soviet intelligence officers in Mexico City in the fall of 1963, few weeks before J.F. Kennedy’s assassination. That meeting has been recalled by one of the “diplomats” present at the meeting that day, Oleg Nechiporenko. The others were Pavel Yatskov, Valery Kostikov and Nikolai Leonov (Now a ret. KGB Lt. General). Kostikov was, according to the CIA, attached to Department 13 of the First Chief Directorate, specialising in “executive action” – sabotage and assassination. Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov as a field officer of the First Chief Directorate specializing in Latin America, recalled a shaking lookalike Oswald, who could not hold a pen to perform simple calculations required for an expert US Marine radar operator. Nosenko who defected to the USA in January 1964, just two months after President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald, had been surveilled during a trip to the Soviet Union, but not recruited, and that another KGB defector working with the CIA was really a plant from Moscow. That was determined to be Peter S. Deriabin, a major in the KGB, serving in Vienna as counterintelligence chief, when he defected to US, in February 1954. He was a WW II heavily decorated SMERSH agent, veteran of the Red Army and former member of the elite Kremlin Guard Directorate. In 1954, he was the highest-ranking Soviet intelligence officer ever to defect. Both ex-KGB spies accused each other of intentionally spreading disinformation on behalf of the Soviet Union. Eventually it was Nosenko who was infamously held for 4 years by the CIA, which suspected him of trying to muddle the testimonies of his former comrade and of shielding inside information of a Soviet plot to kill Kennedy. A few days after the assassination of President J.F. Kennedy, Deriabin wrote a lengthy memorandum to the CIA. He reported his version that Oswald was a KGB agent who either was dispatched to kill J.F.Kennedy, or was sent to the United States on a different mission. Then he committed the assassination on his own. Deriabin contended that the Soviets would have accomplished several objectives by eliminating J.F.Kennedy. Among them were: the removal of the West’s foremost cold war warrior from the scene; constraining US covert actions against Cuba, which would be stigmatized as acts of vengeance; and divert the Russian people’s attentions from their many domestic problems. According to financial documents obtained by the House Committee: “prior to Nosenko’s defection on February 4, 1964, he was promised $50,000 for previous cooperation, $10,000 for his identification in 1962 of a particular espionage agent, and $25,000 a year compensation for future services.” However, Lee Harvey Oswald’s defection to the Soviet Union, in 1959, was deemed as an “intelligence matter” by the US Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). In ensuing years the military intelligence agencies continued to collect information about him. After the publication of the Warren Report, ONI, Army G-2 (Army Intelligence) and even OSI (Air Force Intelligence) also released a series of documents on Oswald from the first of the military intelligence agencies, to consult Oswald’s security file in the State Department. The much publicised Oswald’s discharge from the Marine Reserve, in 1960, was an operation coordinated by Marine G-2 and ONI Counterintelligence. The discharge was used to challenge State Department’s determination that real Oswald had not revoked his U.S. citizenship. Oswald however did not serve in the Navy, Army or Air Force, but he was a Marine like his brother Robert. In October, 1959, at the time of his defection, he was no longer on active duty, but had been transferred six weeks earlier to the Class III Ready Marine Corps Reserve (file 19WH665). Over the next three years, Marine G-2 (Intelligence) both received and disseminated records concerning Oswald, regionally and at Marine HQ. Nevertheless, despite Marine G-2’s sustained interest in Oswald, only few unclassified documents generated by Marine G-2, and presumably a tiny fraction of the whole file were released.
Lt. Col. Allison Folsom, former head of the Marine Headquarters Personnel Records Branch, stated that Oswald’s Marine record was filed and coded 8WH304. Folsom stated that Oswald was never an USMC sharp shooter to get at 200 yards, a score better than 48 and up to 50, in the offhand position. In fact he was never better than 38. Henry Hurt, author of “Reasonable Doubt,” interviewed many of Oswald’s fellow Marines. Hurt said “On the subject of Oswald’s shooting ability, it was laughable.
Nosenko defection and subsequent years of harsh interrogation by the CIA, was one of the main U.S. intelligence controversies of the 1960s, and fueled an intense rivalry between the CIA and the FBI. Nosenko said he handled Lee Harvey Oswald’s KGB surveillance file during his time in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He determined that Oswald was not working for the Soviets when he carried out J.F.Kennedy’s assassination. The fact that Oswald had lived for three years in the Soviet Union led many Americans to believe he might have killed J.F.Kennedy at the order of the Kremlin. If such suspicions had proved correct, the Cold War might have turned hot. Nosenko, however, told the CIA exactly the opposite, that Oswald was not a Soviet agent. CIA Chief of counterintelligence James Angleton believed that Nosenko was a plant and possibly trying to cover up a true, deeper connection between Oswald and the Soviet Union. James Angleton, considered Nosenko a KGB plant meant to destabilize the CIA, while FBI officials believed Nosenko was probably legitimate. The seven-member commission led by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren that investigated the J.F.Kennedy killing, concluded that Oswald acted on his own, but his defection to the Soviet Union and return has inspired numerous conspiracy theories in the years since Kennedy’s murder. The FBI joined Marine G-2 and ONI in requesting the State Department for more information about what they had about Oswald. A famous FBI letter, asking about “Oswald’s “renunciation of his American citizenship,” justified its request for “any current information” by the intriguing “possibility that an imposter was using Oswald’s birth certificate.”

Aleksander Grigoryevich Kopatzky was a Soviet double agent, who was unmasked in 1961 by Anatoliy Golitsyn. A.k.a. Igor Orlov, Aleksandr Navratilov, Calvus; his Soviet code names were Erwin, Herbert and Richard. In 1941, after the start of the German-Soviet war, Kopazky attended a Soviet training school for agents of the NKVD. In October 1943 he was on a parachute jump over occupied Kresy where the German Wehrmacht arrested him and he was taken POW. In 1945, he became American POW and came into contact with the Gehlen’s Abwehr Organization, which recruited him in 1948. From 1949 Kopazky was recruited by the KGB and became one of its most important double agents. The CIA sent him to Berlin in 1951 under the name Franz Koischwitz. On November 7, 1951, he kidnapped the Estonian CIA agent Vladimir Kivi from West Berlin to East Berlin on behalf of the KGB. In 1954, with the help of the CIA, he changed his name to Igor Orlov. In 1957 he attended agent training in the USA and was reinstated in 1958 to Europe. In 1960 he was transferred back to the USA. As a result of the defection of the former KGB agent Anatoliy Golitsyn, the FBI sought Kopazky, who was suspected of being the Soviet mole, ″Sasha.″ After a house search in 1965, he fled for a short time in the Soviet consulate. He refused a flight to the Soviet Union, however, and remained in the United States. Until his death in 1982 he lived unmolested with his wife in Alexandria, Virginia, where they owned an art gallery and frame shop.

After his defection in 1954, The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR gave Peter Sergeyevich Deriabin a death sentence. He testified before the Senate and the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in 1959. While in USA, he graduated of the University of Michigan and University of Virginia. Deriabin worked for CIA as a researcher and analyst. He advised the agency on history, personnel, philosophy and practices of Soviet intelligence. He retired from CIA in 1981and died in Washington DC, in 1992, aged 71.

 

Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko told CIA about listening devices at the US embassy in Moscow, and confirmed the identities of the British Admiralty clerk John Vassall, the Canadian ambassador John Watkins and the CIA agent Edward Ellis Smith, all compromised in KGB “honeytrap” stings, which had been revealed by another defector, Anatoliy Golitsyn. After numerous lie-detector tests and many interrogation sessions, the CIA determined that Nosenko was telling the truth. He was released in 1967, given $80,000 and a new name and sent to spend the rest of his life somewhere in the South, with occasional trips to Langley, Va., to lecture American intelligence professionals at CIA headquarters. Up to 17 audio files of interviews of Nosenko during the investigation of the Kennedy assassination were made public by the National Archives on July 24, 2017. He died on August 27, 2008, aged 81.

 

James Jesus Angleton is also known as the Patron Saint of Homeland Security innovating on classified secrecy, zero accountability, and access to everything. Nosenko owes Angleton almost 4 years in solitary confinement, undergoing Beta version Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, was definitely the precursor for the current Guantanamo Bay status quo and many other secret prisons around the world.

The effects of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion was the creation of animosity towards J.F.Kennedy from the Cuban Exiles and from conservative Americans generally who saw the president as weak, ineffectual, and pink. Thus the willful compromise of the invasion cost J.F.Kennedy considerable political capital, achieved by a vaguely worded communiqué from McGeorge Bundy to the CIA operations officers, of whom Richard Bissel and General Cabell were chief, telling them that they “should not” launch the air attack on the Castro’s T-33 jets. On the other hand KGB and its military branch GRU, contributed to the failure of operation Agadyr, failing to provide detailed info on the real intentions of J.F.Kennedy in regards of Cuba before October 1962. Soviet intelligence did not provide the Soviet leadership updated reports regarding the Executive Committee of the National Security Council meetings of the US government officials that convened to advise President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. For that reason USSR Politburo decided in December 1962 to dismiss Colonel General Semyon Ivanov Chief planner of Operation Agadyr and member of GRU general staff. The KGB Station Chief in Washington, DC, Alkeksandr Feklisov was recalled to Moscow. During the Cuban crisis, the US Navy destroyers dropped “signaling charges called by ” McNamara “practice depth charges,” in order to signal Soviet subs commanders that US Navy had detected their position and inviting them to surface. The invitation was eventually accepted, but only at night when all the subs were recharging the batteries and communicating with Moscow. When the game seemed to be over and American government signaled to Soviets that the subs had been detected, then the subs surfaced except submarine B-4, that escaped the intensive U.S. monitoring (although U.S. patrol aircraft may have spotted it.
After a day of tense discussions within the Executive Committee of senior advisers, on October 27, 1962, President J.F.Kennedy decided on a dual strategy—a formal letter to Khrushchev accepting the implicit terms of his October 26 letter (a U.S. non-invasion pledge in exchange for the verifiable departure of Soviet nuclear missiles), coupled with private assurances to Khrushchev that the United States would speedily take out its missiles from Turkey. That would had happened based on a secret understanding, not as an open agreement that would appear to the public, and to NATO allies, as a concession to blackmail. The U.S. president elected to transmit this sensitive message through his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who met in his office at the Justice Department with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. That meeting has long been recognized as a turning point in the crisis, but several aspects of it have been shrouded in mystery and confusion. One concerned the issue of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey: U.S. officials maintained that neither John nor Robert Kennedy promised to withdraw the Jupiters as a favor or concession, in exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, or as part of a deal, but had simply informed Dobrynin that J.F.Kennedy had planned to take out the American missiles in any event. This was the version of events depicted in the first published account of the R.F.Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting by one of the participants, in Robert Francis Kennedy’s Thirteen Days: A Memoir at the Cuban Missile Crisis, posthumously published in 1969, a year after he was assassinated while seeking the Democratic nomination for president. While Thirteen Days depicted R.F.Kennedy as rejecting any firm agreement to withdraw the Jupiters, this was also the first public indication that the issue had even been privately discussed.

Chairman Khrushchev had wrote to President J.F. Kennedy, on October 26, 1962:
“…I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the WW 2 understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction…”

In return, President Kennedy wrote to Chairman Khrushchev on October 27, 1962:
“…Dear Mr. Chairman, I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem.
The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements. Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend—in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th…”

President John F. Kennedy gravesite in Arlington, VA

President J.F.Kennedy gave the green light to an Eisenhower-initiated invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in April, 1961, carried out by Cuban exiles, based on faulty intelligence, and without the necessary air support. In June 1961 at the Vienna Summit with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Kennedy was unprepared to counterbalance the Soviet initiative. His tough talk about the Soviet Union in Berlin did not improve the situation but instead, the Soviets built the Berlin Wall. His decision not to draw the line against communism in Laos, as the Eisenhower Administration had urged, left South Vietnam as the place to fight communism in Asia. On the other hand, at the President’s urging, Congress established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961 as a separate entity under Department of State control. The Administration built on Eisenhower’s extensive negotiations with the Soviet Union, but the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by Kennedy, only outlawed atmospheric but not underground nuclear testing. In Vietnam, the Kennedy Administration approved the overthrow of President Diem, believing that any successor government would be better than Diem’s, but proving wrong. Finally, U.S. initiatives in Western Europe, such as support for British entry into the European Economic Community and European defense integration, also were unsuccessful.

Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev’s grave in Moscow

Khrushchev gave the appearance of a will to melt the Cold War, but his appointment was greeted with cautious optimism in the West. His aspirations toward peace were sometimes mixed with hostile statements and Khrushchev became a hard man to predict. His posturing on the international stage was mere showmanship during an age when diplomatic work was carried out invariably in a genteel manner and code of manners. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev, along with many other members of the Politburo, was angered that USA had placed military equipment, including B52 bombers, in Turkey, a member of NATO. To the USSR that was a provocative behaviour as long as Turkey shared a border with the Soviet Union. That was why Khrushchev retaliated by placing medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba. He argued that they gave the Communist Caribbean island greater protection against another Bay of Pigs incident. During the crisis, Khrushchev gave no indication of softening his stiffness against J.F.Kennedy. But when he did, it significantly weakened his political position at home, despite his arguments that he had got USA to promise never to invade Cuba. His party colleagues in Moscow were also very concerned that the traditional positive relationship between the USSR and Communist China was also deteriorating and that border issues might spark off a Sino-Soviet war. Khrushchev was levered out of office in October 1964 and succeeded by Alexei Kosygin, as Prime Minister, and Leonid Brezhnev as Party Leader. Khrushchev spent the rest of his years in retirement and died in a hospital after he was stricken at his country estate by three his third major heart attack, on September 11, in 1971. He was buried in Novodevichy Cemetery, the Moscow’s second-ranking burial ground for fallen heroes.
Lyndon Johnson succeeded John Fitzgerald Kennedy as president and like many ‘hawks’ in the White House, Johnson was a fervent supporter of the ‘Domino Theory.’ He was also keen to support South Vietnam against the National Liberation Front (NLF): “If we quit Vietnam tomorrow we’ll be fighting in Hawaii and next week we’ll have to be fighting in San Francisco.” In early 1965, Johnson authorised ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’, which started on February 24th. This was the wholesale bombing of North Vietnam and NLF-held territory in South Vietnam. Initially, ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’ was meant to last for eight weeks, but it lasted for three years. The NLF responded to the bombing by attacking US air bases in the South Vietnam. The commander of US advisors in the South Vietnam, General Westmoreland, informed Johnson that the men he had in the South were inadequate to defend their bases and that he needed more men. Johnson responded by sending in US regulars, but not as ‘advisors’. On March 8, 1965, 3,500 US Marines – combat troops arrived in South Vietnam. Johnson sold this deployment to the US public by claiming that they would be in South Vietnam as a short-term measure. In a poll held in 1965, 80% of those Americans polled indicated that they supported President Lyndon Johnson’s decision. During the war, the United States lost 58,220 military personnel, in which 47,434 were killed in action while 10,786 died by other causes.
When the native Ukrainian Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev came to power after the ouster of his fellow Ukrainian Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev’s, his hold on the Communist party looked a bit uncertain at first. As the leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was a canny and careful Communist Party functionary who sought to make his country the military equal of the United States and promote its political influence around the world through the policy of detente. In late March 1965, Brezhnev announced that his government had been receiving “many applications” from Soviet citizens offering to serve as volunteers in Vietnam. From July 1965 to the end of 1974, around 6,500 officers and generals, as well as more than 4,500 soldiers and sergeants of the Russian armed forces visited the country as ‘advisors’. In addition, Russian military schools and academies trained more than 10,000 Vietnamese military personnel, while only 16 Soviet citizens lost their lives in the entire conflict.

Glienicke Brücke, a small steel structure that crosses the Havel River and links Berlin with Potsdam, spanned the front line of the Cold War for three decades. It was the setting for a few of the most memorable high-value prisoner exchanges between the Soviets and the West.

And so were only the lucky ones:
On February 10, 1962, Francis Gary Powers and Rudolf Abel;
On, April 22, 1964: Greville Wynne and Konon Molody.

REF# WIKIPEDIA PHOTOS

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYMTPTFhYsU

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZuHcPnni14

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pw_0cgO2JKE

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEirto3chaw

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hV3WKAeaZl0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JV7S-THo_Sk

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34QGsEFTQ20

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OIkhrInjSyE

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-brothers-rosenberg-cold-war-spying-2/

https://www.rbth.com/arts/history/2017/08/09/27-western-spy-tools-confiscated-by-the-soviet-kgb_819768

http://www.harringtonmuseum.org.uk/thor-missile-deployment-in-the-uk/

http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/baypigs-tanks.htm

https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/jfk-foreignpolicy

http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nixon-debates-khrushchev-at-a-fair-in-moscow

https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-126-004.aspx

https://wikivisually.com/wiki/Soviet_submarine_B-59

http://www.talkingproud.us/Military/SovietFoxtrots/FoxtrotsCuba.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleg_Gordievsky

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/lt-col-oleg-penkovsky-western-spy-soviet-gru

http://spymuseum.com/major-events/spy-rings/the-portland-spy-ring/

http://www.liquisearch.com/nikita_khrushchev/world_war_ii/war_against_germany

http://www.warhistoryonline.com/cold-war/the-man-who-refused-to-launch-nuclear-missiles.html

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/the-berlin-tunnel-exposed.html

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/bookshelf_10.html

http://j-youraverageamerican.blogspot.ca/2010/10/lessons-learned-from-golytsin-and.html

http://coldwarsites.net/country/germany/the-glienicke-bridge-or-bridge-of-spies-berlin

https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/images/ethel_rosenberg_image.htm

https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/National-Security-Memoranda.aspx

https://www.jfk-assassination.eu/warren/wch/vol8/page307.php

http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/testimony/folsom.htm

https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1942-1945/espionage.htm

 

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